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Abstract:
Aristotle touts the importance of performing virtuous actions in order to
have a virtuous character. Yet, reason is necessary for an individual to
actively change their own behavior. Aristotle believes that children are too
young to have developed reason, so we may wonder how are they to
become virtuous. The answer I offer is shame. Shame is a painful emotion
that causes one to believe that, by acting poorly, we have lowered our
worth in the eyes of those we respect and admire. I argue that shame
effectively changes behavior in children because it is attached to a stigma
of dishonor and the pain of rebuke to activities, which they might
otherwise do. Shame encourages children to reform their behavior by
leading them to forgo the pleasure of one activity so that they do not have
to experience the pain of displeasing those who they hold in high regard,
their peers, and themselves. Remarkably, shame appears to be the only
emotion within Aristotle's framework that has the ability to develop virtue
and morality in children without reason.

Advisors: Prof. Krisanna Scheiter & Prof. Robert Baker
In his ethical treatises Aristotle claims that virtue is acting in accordance with good
reason (NE I.7, 1098a8-16). But he also says that in order to become virtuous, that is, in order to
act in accordance with good reason, we must first act virtuously. Through repeated virtuous
actions we develop habits that shape our character our dispositions. Despite Aristotle advocating
the importance of acting in certain ways early on, he does not explain how we come to perform
virtuous actions in the first place. A child does not have reason and so her actions cannot be in
accordance with reason. Aristotle claims that the child is supposed to be habituated so that their
actions align with the actions of the virtuous person. But if children cannot calculate the ethical
implications of their actions, how are they to adjust their behavior so that they gradually begin to
act more virtuously. In other words, how do we get children to act virtuously, when they do not
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understand the reasons for acting virtuously? I will argue that shame is necessary for moral
education.
According to Aristotle, we have both rational and non-rational desires. Our rational desire
is boulesis, which is a desire for what is good. Since children do not have reason they do not
have a desire for what is good. What they do have are the non-rational desires, namely,
epithumia, which is a desire for bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex, and thumos, the desire
for honor and praise. Shame allows a child to forgo their strong appetitive urges for the sake of
thumetic pleasures, namely that of acceptance in your community, especially those in the
community the child admires and respects. When a child acts on the impulse of their appetite and
anger, if their superiors apply shame properly to that action, it will cause the child to view that
action as painful. It is painful to feel the disapproval of those one looks up to, and even more so
to realize that your actions have caused those individuals to think less of you.
A child will understand that they have lowered themselves in the eyes of others, but still
know they feel they are not that inferior. The known discrepancy between how they have
presented themselves and how they feel they are ignites a drive to redeem themselves for their
shameful actions. In the future, the child will forgo the pleasurable actions of the appetite and
anger if they wish to avoid the pain of shame that arises from the anticipation of thumetic
condemnation of those whose opinions matter to them.
Children are motivated to act on their desires for pleasure and retaliation because they
imagine the pleasure they will experience when they act on those desires. If, however, the child
anticipates the disapproval of those they admire, then they will no longer be able to focus on the
pleasurable aspects of the action. By taking away the pleasure of anticipation, and replacing it
with an emotional pain, then the child loses the motivation to commit the action.
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I will show that shame is the key to habituating a child to act virtuously in the absence of
reason. First, I will describe why virtue is the most worthwhile end-goal for Aristotle, and that all
humans should strive for virtue for its own sakes. I will then discuss Aristotle’s account of
pleasure and pain before explaining how people develop a certain character through habituation.
Finally, I will present Aristotle’s account of shame, and the role shame plays in creating virtuous
children without the use for reason.
Shame, when used properly, creates virtuous children by encouraging them to understand
non-virtuous actions as those which alienate the individuals they care for most. The only way to
redeem themselves for their actions is to avoid those actions in the future. In this way, progress is
slow and steady, but the child will eventually come to be virtuous through steady habituation.
This conclusion is extremely important for understanding Aristotle’s account of virtue in his
ethical treatises. But it is also important for understanding moral education in general. If
Aristotle is right, then we have an interesting theory about how to steer children toward morality
since they are unable to do it alone and are necessarily dependent on their community and family
for such moral training.
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CHAPTER ONE: ON VIRTUE
For Aristotle, the good, eudaimonia, is “that which all things seek” (Rorty 18; NE I.1,
1094a3). The good is necessarily self-sufficient and complete, meaning that we seek it for it’s
own sake. If the good were not self-sufficient and complete, we would choose everything for the
sake of something else, “making the sequence go on to infinity, making our desires empty and
vain” (NE I.2, 1094a19-21). The good is an end, not a means to an end. For example, we would
seek employment to pay for one’s education, seek education to secure a more prestigious job,
seek the more prestigious job in order to buy more clothes, seek to buy more clothes to look
professional to secure an even more prestigious job in order to buy a large home, and on and on.
Hypothetically, in this scenario, without the presence of the good would continue on because we
would not seek something for its own sake, but merely for the sake of something else, for the
sake of something else afterwards. Rather, Aristotle argues, we all act in pursuit of the good.
Let us examine what the good entails. As Aristotle says, “one must try to grasp [the good]
at least in outline,” if we are to understand how one ought to pursue the good, in the way a
skilled archer can successfully hit a target (NE I.2, 1094a23-27). Knowledge of this outline can
inform us about how to live well.
The good “legislates about what one must do and what things to abstain from doing” (NE
I.2, 1094b5). What one does is just as important as what one does not do. This is crucial, because
without knowing the good, and the nature of the thing we seek for it’s own sake, we will not
recognize it, and find ourselves trapped in the infinite sequence of merely seeking things, for the
sake of other things. Once one goal is attained, another goal takes its place and nothing of great
value is achieved. This infinite sequence is undesirable because it is an unending process of
aiming for goals that are always replaced by another goal, though the goals bring no satisfaction.
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Since “what is fine is found to an even greater degree in unchanging things,” such a circular
sequence of unsatisfactory goals is not what the good entails (EE I.8, 1218a23). Things that are
longer-lasting are better than things that are short-lived, for it is more secure, and we enjoy
things more that are secure, for we may rely on their being present (Rhetoric I.7, 1364b30-34). 	
  
When we understand the good, we understand what we ought to seek. Hence, states
Aristotle, “the good itself would be this: the goal of all that is achievable by human action” (EE
I.8, 1218b13-14). Every human will agree that we seek happiness (eudaimonia) above all else, as
it is the highest achievable good (NE I.4, 1095a15-16; EE I.7, 1217a40-41). We all seek
happiness because it is a form of the good, the chief good, which all things seek (EE I.8, 1217b616; NE I.2, 1094a22). It is what is best, finest, and pleasantest (NE I.8, 1099a25). Everything we
do represents a movement toward what we believe will make us happy. It is the case that each
thing we do is a mere movement towards happiness rather than a fulfillment or failure of
happiness, for, “neither does a single day, or a short time, make a man blessed and happy” (NE
I.7, 1098a17-20).
For Aristotle, virtuousness is a disposition (hexis), as opposed to an affection or a
capacity (NE II.5, 1105b23-1106a12). By “affections,” Aristotle means those emotions and
moods that act on us, attended by pleasure and pain, including appetite, anger, fear, hatred, joy,
and friendliness (NE II.5, 1105b20-23). By capacities, Aristotle means our capacity to fulfill the
affections. For example, the ability to become angry is the capacity for anger. Dispositions are
the character traits that, like happiness, must be built up over great swaths of time.
Happiness, for Aristotle, is living well and doing well (NE I.4, 1095a20). It is never
desirable for anything but itself, making it self-sufficient, complete, and stable (NE I.7, 1097a331097b1). Much like happiness, we choose honor, pleasure, intelligence and justice for their own
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sakes, and these can contribute to our happiness (NE I.7, 1097b1-5). And while happiness may
be found in (a) pleasure, (b) virtue, and (c) wisdom, Aristotle claims that happiness is “the
activity of a complete life in accordance with virtue.” (EE I.1, 1214a19-21; EE II.1, 1219a3738). Our desire for happiness motivates us to better ourselves. If one can determine how to
become virtuous, they will know how to be happy and achieve the highest good humanly
possible.

i.

Two Categories of Virtue
Aristotle acknowledges two categories of virtue: (1) virtue of character and (2) virtue of

intellect (NE II.1, 1103a15-16). Each type of virtue corresponds to a different sort of happy life:
the life of intellectual fulfillment, and the life of character fulfillment. The two are by no means
mutually exclusive. However, the life of the intellectually virtuous, as we shall discuss, has less
to do with ethics, honor, and pleasure than the life of the one who has virtue of character.
Furthermore, it is far more difficult to develop a child’s character virtue than intellectual virtue.
Intellectual virtue is exists entirely within the scope of the reasoning part of the soul, and
includes scientific knowledge, reason, intellectual accomplishment, and practical wisdom
(phronēsis) (NE VI.3, 1139b32-1141a20; Rorty 205). Yet, one piece of intellectual virtue can be
taught to those without reason (NE II.1, 1103a16-17; NE VI.1, 1138b26-34). Children do not
have reason, but can become great geometers and mathematicians because these subjects require
knowledge of abstract principles, rather than knowledge of particulars (NE VI.8, 1142a111142a21). Abstractions, universals, can be taught to anyone who can remember them, whereas
particulars cannot be taught in the same way.
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Learning about particulars takes time, while this is not true of universals. One cannot
memorize universal truths or laws, written or merely understood, though one cannot incorporate
all the particulars into a universal truth (NE V.10, 1137b13-24). For example, it is easy to learn
the alphabet, including the specific sounds that each letter ought to make. Children can master
their ABCs. But, it is far more challenging, and takes much more time for children to learn the
particular circumstances when letters must be silent or pronounced differently. Even if they are
taught that “B” makes a certain sound, they will need time and experience to become familiar
with the particular words that contradict the universal rule, such as climb, thumb, subtle. Reason
need not be developed for one to know universal laws, principles, and social norms. Universals
are accessible to children through teaching and memorization. This is not so with particulars.
Actions, however, exists at the level of particulars (NE III.1, 1110b35-1111a1; Moss
183). The particulars of any circumstance include who is acting, the motivation for action, how
the person is carrying out the action, when the action is taking place, and the nature of the action
(cruel, kind, etc.) (NE III.1, 1111a3-6). It is nonsensical to believe that universals will apply
fittingly to all circumstances. Particulars often do not conform to the rules of universals, making
any assessments of circumstances based on universals somewhat unreliable.
Without intimate knowledge of, and experiences dealing with similar particulars, we
cannot be confident in our assessments of, or reactions to any circumstance. Without knowledge
of the particulars, we cannot know the ramifications of our reactions to circumstances either.
Aristotle argues that every worthless adult is “ignorant of what one should do and what one
should abstain from, and it is because of this sort of mistake that there come to be unjust people,
and bad people in general” (NE III.1, 1110b27-31). Badness, injustice, and worthlessness in
adulthood, therefore, stems from ignorance of particulars.
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Abolishing ignorance of particulars, then, eradicates badness, injustice, and worthlessness
in adulthood. Abolishing ignorance of universals makes children good geometers,
mathematicians and memorizers. Children can only cultivate intellectual virtue at the level of
universals, for mastering the particulars takes experience, experimentation, and time. Therefore, I
will not focus on, intellectual virtue, or consider it a meaningful part of my discussion on the
moral development of children.
Virtue of character describes the faculty which “provides and preserves good things”
through actions and affections (Rhetoric I.9, 1366a31-34; NE III.1, 110930-31). The virtues of
character are dispositions within us that allow us to act, react to others, and experience emotions
in ways that align with the good. As this type of virtue is associated with the characteristics of
justice, courage, temperance, prudence, and kindness, it is also the one that has more to do with
ethics (Rhetoric I.9, 1366b1-24). Intellectual virtues are certainly important for happiness and
morality overall in a reasoning adult. However, Aristotle believed that with children, their
education in reason must follow education in bodily discipline and habituation (Politics VIII.3,
1338b2-5). Since Aristotle argues that habituation is the way to develop character virtue, I take
this statement to mean that training in character virtue must precede training in intellectual
virtue. Therefore, it is all the more crucial to highlight the significance of character virtue in the
moral development of children.
Children are more than capable of cultivating character virtue, which is focused on
action, on particulars. Character virtue, unlike the majority of intellectual virtues, requires a
sense of particulars. Moreover, character virtue is simply more applicable to children since
children do not have reason. While intellectual virtue belongs to the rational part of the soul,
character virtue belongs to the non-rational part of the soul (Moss 165).
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Though the virtues of character belong to the non-rational part of the soul, the nonrational part of the soul follows the rational part (EE II.1, 1220a10-11). Aristotle wrote
“[Socrates] was wrong in that he thought that all the virtues were forms of wisdom, but he was
right to claim that they require wisdom” (EE V.13, 1144b20-21). Aristotle explains that virtue is
a state “accompanied by correct reasoning,” and by reasoning, he means practical wisdom (EE
V.13, 1144b23-28). Practical wisdom is inextricably linked with actions, and practical wisdom is
about knowledge of particulars and perception (EE V.13, 1145a1-6). Expanding on his
description of happiness to neccesitate practical wisdom, Aristotle states, “each person has just
as much happiness as he has virtue, practical wisdom, and the action that expresses them”
(Politics VII.I, 1323b22-24).
It may seem contradictory to state that children, who lack reason, can develop their
virtues of character, which also are dependent on practical wisdom, belonging to the rational part
of the soul. In Politics, Aristotle explains:
Despite the fact that since a child is incompletely developed, it is clear that his
virtue too does not belong to him in relation to himself but in relation to his end
and to his leader. (Politics I.13, 1260a31-33)
A child need not have reason to develop virtues of character, that onus lies with the parents,
guardians, mentors, and other elders the child forms strong relationships with. I will elaborate on
this point in my discussion of the Apparent Good. A child can develop their character virtues
with the assistance of their elders, relations, and community members. However, save for one
facet, a child cannot develop their intellectual virtue. For our purposes, when speaking of virtue,
I will focus only on virtue of character from this point forward.
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ii. Function Argument
Aristotle’s Function Argument sets the precedent that the function of a thing determines
how it ought to act, if the thing is to act in accordance with virtue (NE I.7, 1097b22-33). If a
thing cannot implement it’s function well, then that thing is not entirely virtuous. To clarify,
when referring to virtue (arête), Aristotle means excellence of any sort. Virtue, in the
Aristotelian context, is not a term that refers exclusively to humans or sentient beings. For
example, the function of a knife is to cut. If the knife is dull, bent, or flimsy, it will not cut well
and fail to perform its function well. Thus, a knife that does not cut well is not virtuous; it does
not have arête.
Each thing has a specific function, which distinguishes one thing from another (EE II.1,
1219a1-10). The function of each thing is its end goal (EE II.1, 1219a1-10). This is why we are
aware of the difference between a knife, a table, a plate, and a tree. Each thing “strives for its
own good – the eye for sight, the body for health, other things for other goods in the same way”
(EE I.8, 1218a32). Every thing has a function, and the potential to be virtuous in its own right by
performing its function well. Nothing other than humankind is capable of reason, making reason
peculiar to, and the function of humans (Politics VII.14, 1332b3-5; NE I.7, 1097b31-1098a5).
Aristotle states that the function of a human is activity of the soul in accordance with
reason (NE I.7, 1098a1-7). The virtue and the good of a thing are measured by how well it
performs its function, its purpose of existence. To sum up; “virtue, then, is a disposition of this
kind, which is brought about by the best movements of the soul and which produces the best
functions and affections of the soul” (EE II.1, 1220a29-31). Essentially, virtue and function are
intertwined, such that the function of a human is to fulfill their capacity for virtue, via exhibiting
the right affections of the soul. With the knowledge that performing one’s function well begets
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virtue and happiness, one must learn to perform one’s function well. One must learn to live in
accordance with reason and practical wisdom. Questions remain. How do we become virtuous?
How do we know how to act? How do we come to possess correct reason?

iii.

Doctrine of the Mean
Intuitively, an individual that knows the human function would have no trouble

understanding how to live according to good reason. Yet, Aristotle observes the practical
difficulty in actually living in accordance with reason. If we were perfectly wise and had
practical wisdom, how would we act?
Each moment presents a new combination of mental, physical, social factors. No moment
is the same as a previous one, making it quite challenging to know how to act virtuously. How
are we to know how to act then? Aristotle offers comfort; “it will be possible for [virtue] to
belong, through some kind of learning or practice, to anyone not handicapped in relation to
excellence” (NE I.9, 1099b19-21). All we can do is try to do what we think would be the most
reasonable given our knowledge of the circumstances and our options:
For we consider that the truly good and sensible the person bears what fortune
brings him with the good grace, and acts on each occasion in the finest way
possible given the resources at the time, just as we think that a good general uses
the army he has to the best strategic advantage, and a shoemaker makes a shoe as
finely as it can be made out of the hides he has been given. (NE I.10, 1101a1-5)
Virtue represents an ideal that we strive for. We may never live according to perfect reason, but
we can act in ways that we think would be best. Aristotle suggests we try to act in ways that we
would choose “if [we] could acquire understanding and practical wisdom” (Rhetoric I.7,
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1363b13-15). We strive to do our best given what we know of our ability, our circumstances, and
the options available to us. In our efforts to act more virtuous, we move towards greater virtue.
A prerequisite of virtue is being able “to be affected when one should, at the things one
should, in relation to the people one should for the reasons one should, and in the way one
should” (NE II.6, 1106b20-23). The virtuous person fulfills these criteria without much thought.
However, for someone actively trying to become virtuous, being affected when they should, in
the way they should and so forth, is difficult. It is often hard to know what the virtuous action is
for the non-virtuous person.
In order to attempt to act virtuously, we must ask ourselves how we think we would act if
we could acquire a greater understanding of the world, and ourselves if we had more practical
wisdom (Rhetoric I.7, 1363b13-15). When we reflect on which actions a more virtuous version
of ourselves would choose, we are likely to want to do that action, since we think it is more
virtuous, and will bring us greater overall happiness. Aristotle states:
[B]oth the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good;
the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former
entails possession of the good things subsequently. (Rhetoric I.6, 1362a34-36)
By adjusting our actions in small ways, we slowly move in the right direction, towards virtue.
Phase out one non-virtuous action. Phase in one virtuous action. Gradually, in this manner of
continuously making minor changes, we would become more virtuous.
Virtue of character involves acting in ways that show one is rational, and is acting in a
manner that is the most reasonable in a given situation, which is quite difficult to do. Aristotle
presents us with the Doctrine of the Mean to give us a practical guide to navigate the array of
options in any given case so as to act with virtue.
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Aristotle uses the metaphor of attempting to hit a target to demonstrate the difficulty of
reasoning well; “single and straight is the road of the good: the bad go every which way” (NE
II.6, 1106b35). As virtue itself is a “kind of intermediacy,” the best we can do is aim for the
intermediate affections and actions in the circumstances we find ourselves in so we may travel
that road of the good (NE II.6, 1106b27).
Imagine a stranger approached, and slapped another without warning. The irascible
person, overtaken by anger, might fight back, in an uncontrollable rage. The timid person would
shrink away and flee, believing they must have done something to deserve the slap. The virtuous
person would perhaps be ready to defend himself or herself, but not allow their anger to be too
great or too little. The virtuous person hits the target, in each circumstance, by finding the
appropriate mean for emotion and action for that specific circumstance.
The center of the target is the unattainable ideal. No matter how virtuous our actions,
there will always be something we could have tweaked and made more virtuous. In each
situation, we can interpret any minute detail incorrectly, or fail to think to act in a more virtuous
way. It is about not only determining how much of one trait is appropriate in a given case, but
how much of every possible trait is appropriate to a particular case, and what to do in a given
moment in a given place at a given time. Finding the mean involves finding the appropriate
amount of the array of emotions that may come to you at any time. The virtuous mean is a
slippery target, for it shifts depending on the circumstance, and one cannot always be sure what
the virtuous response truly is until hindsight makes clear what the right response was. But, the
virtues to do with character are dispositions that lie somewhere in the middle of deficiency and
excess.
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When we ask ourselves how ought we act to be virtuous, we must use what we know to
help us determine the mean between the two extremes possible in any circumstace. How much
anger do I think might be appropriate? How much confidence, pity, joy? Searching for this mean
will at least help us reflect on what it means to be virtuous and help us along the path towards
virtue. Surely the effort to find the intermediate is more important more than being correct about
the virtuous mean.
Virtue cannot be realized passively, but must be realized actively. A sleeping person
cannot demonstrate their virtue if they remain asleep. A hypothetical person locked in a box may
know what virtue is, and know which actions are virtuous. Some believe they can be virtuous if
they know about virtue, and can speak about what activity and characteristics it entails. This is
not the case:
Most people…by taking refuge in talk, think that they are philosophizing and that
they will become excellent this way, so behaving rather like sick people, when
they listen carefully to their doctors but then fail to do anything of what is
prescribed to them. (NE II.4, 1105b12-16)
One does not recover from illness by being aware of what is needed to restore health. The person
must act on that awareness for any betterment to take place. The same is true of virtue. Unless a
person demonstrates their virtue through action, they have merely the potential for virtue rather
than actual virtue.

iv.

Starting Points
Aristotle argues, as a prerequisite for action, knowledge, or further belief, “one must

begin from what is knowable…what is knowable in relation to us, and what is knowable without
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qualification” (NE I.4, 1095b2-4; Burnyeat 71-72). There exists what we believe to be true, and
what is true. Becoming virtuous is contingent on our ability to be correct in our assessment of
any given circumstance, and our ability to adapt to those circumstances given what we think we
know (NE I.6, 1096a31-32; NE V.11, 1137b33). What we think we know is not necessarily true,
but this serves as our starting point for action. Our starting points are the basis for all our actions
and thoughts. We acquire them via induction, perception, or habituation (NE I.7, 1098b3-5).
All the experiences, knowledge, perceptions, and thoughts serve as the basis for present
and future action. Since these starting points are acquired by induction (intellect), perception
(sensory input), and habituation (experience over time), children are limited in their starting
points. Children have not had much experience in their short lives, and can only develop one
aspect of their intellectual virtue. Their starting points are dependent on the way they have been
habituated thus far, perceptions, and knowledge of universals, as discussed previously.
The virtuous person must “discriminate correctly in every set of circumstances…being
like a carpenter’s rule or measure for them” (NE III.4, 1113a30-34). As one can imagine,
discriminating correctly in every set of circumstances is quite difficult, given the infinite
possibilities that one must consider in acting in each given circumstance. This becomes even
more difficult when our starting points do not provide us with a collection of knowledge,
perception, and perceptions that show us what virtue is and how to find the virtuous mean.
Aristotle himself speaks about how it is impossible to tell a person how to find the virtuous
without being wrong in most circumstances. This is why, given the variety of possible starting
points, we can begin to aim at the apparent good, what are starting points show us is good, rather
than aim at the actual good.
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Being virtuous is rare, for it is quite difficult and requires us to have the proper bodily
resources, external resources, and good fortune. Reasoning alone cannot teach us the starting
points:
Neither in that case, then, does reasoning teach us the starting points, nor does it
in the present one; instead, it is excellence, innate or resulting from habit-training,
that gives us correct judgment about the starting point. (NE VII.9, 1151a17-20)
Our ability to have the correct starting points, to discover the virtuous mean, is contingent on the
resources we are born with and find ourselves enjoying throughout life. Aristotle believes it
would be prohibitively difficult and unlikely for someone without such resources to become
virtuous.
	
  
v.

Necessary Resources, Virtuous Community, and Good Fortune
In order to live a virtuous life, we must possess bodily resources, external resources, and

good fortune (NE VII.13, 1153bb16-25). By bodily and external resources, Aristotle refers to
good birth, political power, financial stability, education, beauty, and good health and a virtuous
community (NE I.9, 1099a31-32). Good fortune is necessary, because great turns of bad fortune
will “crush and maim one’s blessedness” by bringing on many pains and obstruct efforts to be
virtuous (NE I.10, 1100b28-30; NE I.10, 1100a8-12). The impoverished, chronically sick,
hungry, and uneducated people will be so focused on securing basic necessities for themselves
and their families that virtue is not even a goal they can spare time for. Only someone who has
the proper resources and good fortune can afford to devote their time and energy to determining
what virtue is, and becoming virtuous themselves. Even for one with all the resources and good
fortune, virtue is difficult to achieve.
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Aristotle stresses that without external resources, such as good birth, financial stability,
satisfactory social and familial relationships, and adequate education, the chances that one will
be excellent is slim. Virtue is a disposition, which is difficult to fulfill even for those with
external resources. There is no “education in riches,” power, or good birth, yet those with such
resources have the luxury of not spending their energy or time obtaining them. This allows the
rich, powerful, high-born person the ability to pursue virtue. The same luxury is not available to
the poor, sick, and ignorant masses who do not lead virtuous lives.
Furthermore, if not brought up in a virtuous community, we will probably not become
virtuous, since we virtuous people steer the young from making mistakes (NE VIII.1, 1155a13).
If the young are steered from the incorrect “mistakes,” they will also be steered from virtue.
Those raising children, and those who form relationships with them influence the children
greatly. Previously, I explained that children are capable of achieving virtue so long as their
leaders possess virtue. If their leaders, parents, other relations do not have sufficient virtue, they
cannot lead children to virtue either. How can someone pass on what they do not themselves
know or practice? Children must be exposed to virtue in their upbringing by those who have
power over them.

vi.

The Apparent Good
Virtue is theoretically available to anyone who can live in accordance with good reason,

reliably find the intermediate actions and affections, and determine what the true indicators of
the good are. We have said that we naturally aim for what is good by doing what we think will
bring the greatest happiness to us. But, what appears good and what is good are often in
contradiction. Different people see different things as good (NE III.4, 1113a23).
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“A thing is good if it as men wish,” but problematically, people do not always know
whether something appears to them good falsely, or if it is good in reality (Rhetoric I.6,
1362b24-25). Since “what aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance,” what appears
good in reality and not merely in appearance is the best good (Rhetoric I.7, 1365a35-1365b1).
This is the good, which is understood through either proper habituation or accurate reasoning.
There is no consensus on what will bring about virtue among different sorts of people, so
it is difficult to come to a consensus as to how to become virtuous and happy (Politics VIII.2,
1337a43-1337b2). We are not even in control of the things that appear good to us (NE III.5,
1114a31-33). These things are determined by our dispositions. What we think is good for
ourselves will differ from what another person says they think the good to be (EE VI.11,
1152b22-23). And since “pleasant activity touches on the end itself,” many mistake pleasure to
be the highest good and what will bring them happiness (NE III.9, 1117b16-17). I will go into
greater depth about pleasure in the next chapter.
The good is misinterpreted all the time. To reiterate, Aristotle argued that we all aim to
find happiness, which is comprised of pleasure, virtue, and wisdom. Bodily pleasure is the
absolute easiest to achieve, and is often mistaken by the masses to be happiness, for it is the only
of the three they may have access to. The masses likely do not have the ideal combination of
resources, good fortune, and will to be virtuous and wise to have fulfilled these two criteria for
happiness. Sleeping, eating, drinking are all quite pleasurable, yet will not grant anyone
happiness if virtue is lacking.
We mistake pleasure for the good when we either reason or perceive something
incorrectly (EE II.10, 1226a32-34). “Decision is accompanied by reasoning and thought,” and
since decision precedes action, which leads to dispositions, which leads to virtue, the ability to

	
  

18	
  

reason well is absolutely necessary for one to cultivate virtue (NE III.2, 1112a16-17). The
question we have yet to answer is, how is one without reason to know the actual good and
become virtuous? Without reason, children are left with their habits and perceptions to guide
their action. Habit and perception alone are not enough for them to distinguish the actual good
from the apparent good. I find that pleasure and pain, will illustrate the reasons for children’s
action, and show how they can become re-habituated to act virtuously and to act on the actual
good without reason.
Aristotle is certain that virtue has to do with pleasures and pains (NE II.4, 1105a10-15).
We will now turn our focus to Aristotle’s account of pleasure and pain as they relate to the
virtuous disposition.
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CHAPTER TWO: ON PLEASURE AND PAIN
There exists a dichotomy between the concept of the good and pleasure, as well as what
we believe to be bad for ourselves and pain. Pleasure and pain are not connected to the
“goodness” or “badness” of something. Rather, they are connected to ease with which an action
or a state comes to us. It turns out that both pain and pleasure can either entice us to act
virtuously, or entice us to act poorly. For Aristotle, he virtuous person is pleased and pained at
certain things that coincide with their virtuous disposition. One cannot be considered virtuous if
one acts virtuously, but does not enjoy the virtuous actions. In this chapter, I will explain how
one’s experiences with pleasure and pain influence our actions and degree of virtue.
Pleasure is defined as “a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought
into its normal state of being” (Rhetoric I.11, 1369b33-34). Pain is the opposite, a movement that
consciously distances the soul as a whole from its normal state of being (Rhetoric I.11, 1369b351370a3). By “normal,” Aristotle means that which comes naturally and easily to us by nature.
For example, by nature, fire is hot, and stones do not move upwards, but are weighted down to
the ground (NE II.1, 1103a19-26). What comes easily and feels more natural will always be more
pleasurable. Think on times where you have had too little sleep, too little or too much to eat,
become ill, stubbed a toe, or felt thirsty from dehydration. Let us assume that it feels natural to
get adequate sleep, nourishment, and water, as well as enjoy bodily health and freedom from
injury. Pleasure is not intrinsically good or bad. Different people experience pleasure in more or
less virtuous ways depending on what comes naturally to them (Rorty 285).
Once the natural state is altered, we feel pain to some degree. We may call this
discomfort or distress for milder forms of pain. And what is painful is what is forced, for it
removes us from our natural states (Rhetoric I.11, 1370a7-10). We would not choose hunger,
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thirst, illness, physical injury, or the deprivation of what we are used to having. When we
experience these things, it is by force, and thereby, we experience pain. The poet Eueus of Paros
wrote, “all that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul” (Rhetoric I.11, 1370a11).
We know that pleasure must be a good thing, for animals naturally are drawn to it
(Rhetoric I.5, 1362a6). If one pleasure is greater than another, then that is the better pleasure, if it
lasts longer or is not accompanied with pain (Rhetoric I.7, 1364b25-26; Rhetoric I.7, 1364b3035). However, pain and pleasure are not limited to the realm of the physical. Any act of
concentration or great effort, unless we are used to them, is painful, while any relaxation,
“freedom from evil,” amusement, and rest are pleasant (Rhetoric I.11, 1370a13-16, Rhetoric
I.11, 1370b7). It is also pleasant or painful merely to imagine good or bad things happening.
Imagination here is phantasia. This involves holding past, present, or future images and perceptions in
our minds. Phantasia is crucial to anticipation, memory, intellect, and thought (Moss 3).

It makes sense, then, that “the pleasure and pain that supervenes on what people do
should be treated as a sign of their dispositions” (NE II.3, 1104b4-56). Whatever we do on our
own is pleasurable to us. If it is pleasurable for me to read books, I will be much more likely to
read books than the person who dislikes reading and instead takes pleasure in snowboarding, for
example. I would be considered a bookworm, and the other person, a snowboarder. Even if the
snowboarder were forced to read books for his courses, this would not make him a lover of
books, merely someone who must, at times, read books. Virtuous people must take pleasure in
what is virtuous as well:
For excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of
pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing
fine things. It is through pleasures ad and pains that that people become bad, i.e.
by pursuing them and running away from them, either the ones they shouldn’t, or
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when they shouldn’t, or in a way they shouldn’t, or however many other
distinctions are made in one’s prescriptions. (NE II.3, 1104b8-24)
What we take pleasure in, we wish for more of. What pains us, we wish for less of. Since desire
is merely a yearning for pleasure, our desires cause us to act such that we do what we think will
give us greater pleasure (Rhetoric I.11, 1370a17-18). Now, there are different types of pleasure,
as suggested earlier, that are associated with dispositions, our character (NE X.9, 1175a23-25;
NE II.3, 1113a33).
Let us think of pleasure and pain as magnetic forces on a compass that point toward the
virtuous ideal. It is easy for someone to to get an incorrect reading if they desire the pleasures not
associated with the virtuous person. The virtuous person “discriminates correctly in every set of
circumstances” (NE II.3, 1113a30-31). They take pleasure in what is fine and noble, while being
pained at what is base (Burnyeat 75; NE X.9, 1179b4-31). The non-virtuous person then, would
look for pleasure in eating sweets to excess, being physically inactive, avoiding mental strain that
comes with learning, letting the pleasure of the emotions overtake them.
In the previous chapter, I spoke about the problematic division between the apparent
good and the actual good. Knowing what pleasures and pains are noble, and which one’s are in
fact base, make all the difference in the world. When one can discern a virtuous pleasure from a
base pleasure, they can acclimate themselves to the notion that our pleasures define who we are
as people, and make a change.
Like virtue, pleasures that are stable and self-sufficient are going to be the higher quality
pleasures that will lead one toward virtuous actions. For example, one such pleasure is the joy of
rational contemplation. Any activity, whether mental or physical, that exercises our human
function is virtuous, and aims toward the good and the happy, complete life. Conversely,
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fleeting, un-sustainable pleasures from eating, drinking, extreme emotion, and other intoxicating
things are not virtuous. These pleasures weaken us, by limiting our participation in the rational
part of our souls (Politics VIII.7, 1342b25). Is it difficult to remember a time when our cravings
for these intense, and short-lived bodily pleasures were based on rational thinking rather than
carnal urges? These carnal urges share in the pleasures that animals seek.
Echoing Plato’s division of the soul, Aristotle recognizes three categories of pleasures,
the appetetive, the thumetic, and the rational or virtuous pleasures (Burnyeat 79). Appetetive
desires include excessive bodily pleasures of food, drink, and sex, and avoidance of bodily pains
like hunger, thirst, cold, and all things painful related to touch and taste” (NE VII.4, 1148a5-8).
Thumetic desires involving the pursuit of honor and friendship are a sort of quasi-reasoning,
which is available to children and animals (Pearson 153-154). Appetite can obey thumetic
desires. But, if appetite is allowed to run rampant, we are nothing more than self-indulgent, mad
animals. For desire, it is important to tamp down the appetetive desires, rein them in with either
pleasures of the rational part of the soul or thumetic desires.
Aristotle believes that humans are above animals due to our reason. If we fail to exercise
our reason, we are no more than lowly, animalistic brutes. And what we take pleasure and pain in
indicates our kinship with the fine, or base. Therefore, cultivating a desire for longer lasting
pleasures, which engage the reasoning part of the soul, is the way to become virtuous. The most
virtuous pleasures are those that are moderate, as in, not overly indulgent. If we have intense
cravings for such intoxicating pleasures and find it hard to deny ourselves of them, we are
ourselves in an “excessive state of self-indulgence” (NE II.7, 1107b4-6). Longer-lasting
pleasures include health, physical fitness, acquiring skills, and learning. Other, pleasures that are
desirable in themselves include honor, winning, and wealth (NE VII.4, 1147b30-1147b32).
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Conversely, developing virtue requires that we must endure certain pains. Selfbetterment, by its nature, entails change in ourselves. If there were no change, there would be no
betterment, merely a continuation of what already is. Self-betterment entails change, and that
change is not natural to us, else we would have been better without effort. However, we all can
attest to the truth that there is no self-betterment without effort on our parts. Aristotle observed
that, even when we put in great effort for something great, it still pains us, for it is difficult, and
not what we are used to. Pain through some kind of force or coercion is required to reap the
benefits of the more gratifying, longer-lasting pleasures of virtue (Rhetoric I.7, 1364b30-34).
It is important to determine why we cannot be a certain disposition unless we are pleased
and pained by the things that correspond with that disposition. Note that “someone who holds
back from bodily pleasure and does so cheerfully is a moderate person, while someone who is
upset at doing so is self-indulgent” (NE II.3, 1104b5-7). The best pleasures are those that are not
immediate and may require some strain or effort in order to achieve it:
You may give up pleasures on the spot and the pain later, or gain on the spot and
the loss later. That is what appeals to the weak-willed persons—and weakness of
will may be shown with regard to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary
appeal to you—as it does appeal to the self-controlled and sensible people—that
the pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and last
longer. (Rhetoric I.12, 1372b12-16)
Therefore, fleeting pains can lead to greater overall pleasures, whereas this is not so with
pleasures (Rhetoric I.7, 1364b30-34). When one is used to being sedentary, or eating poorly, the
first times that one tries exercising or eating healthier foods are somewhat painful to that person,
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but only immediately so. In time, these choices will lead to better health and leave one with a
lasting feeling of pleasure, like that of health rather than sickness or weakness.
It is imperative that one experiences pain and pleasure at the right things:
Happiness is an end that everyone thinks is accompanied not by pain but
by pleasure. This pleasure is not the same for everyone, however, but each takes it
to be what suits himself and his condition, and the best person takes it to be the
best pleasure, the one that comes from the noblest things. (Politics VIII.3,
1338a5-9)
Clearly then, for Aristotle, if virtue is happiness, and everyone seeks happiness, then the one who
experiences noble pleasures is the one who is happiest and most virtuous.
We become virtuous by acting virtuously. The sort of person we are is dependent upon
the sorts of actions that give us pleasure, for we are inclined to act in ways that give us pleasure
rather than the opposite. We cannot be said to be what we do not take pleasure in, because
though we may be that sort of person one day, we are forcing what we are not today. For
example, if Jim wishes to live a fit lifestyle, yet loathes going to the gym, whether he goes to the
gym or not does not matter. Only if Jim enjoys going to the gym and eating healthily can he be
said to be a healthy eater and a fit person. If Jim does not enjoy going to the gym and eating
healthily, he is not likely to continue with this routine if he does not enjoy it. If Jim enjoyed
going to the gym and eating healthily, and was convinced it was good, it is unlikely he would
stray from that habit. Therefore, he cannot said to be healthy is he does not enjoy being healthy.
Since we can only be the type of person that enjoys the activity that corresponds to our
dispositions, we must enjoy virtuous activity to be virtuous, and remain virtuous. With children,
however, they are born with the capacity for appetitetive and thumetic pleasures (Pearson 153-
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154). Appetetive pleasures lead us to live a life like an animal that cannot use reason to
determine the higher pleasures (Pearson 154). Instead, the young are driven by intense desires to
win honor and satisfy their bodily hungers and emotions to excess (Rhetoric II.12, 1389a2-13).
As the appetite is supposed to be guided by reason, and children have no reason to re-calibrate
their non-virtuous pleasures, how are children supposed to become virtuous? Children must
develop pleasures and pains that correspond with the virtuous pleasures and pains, yet lack the
faculty to develop these pleasures and pains on their own.
It is far harder to “withstand what is painful than to hold back from what is pleasant,” so
children certainly cannot be counted on to avoid the non-virtuous, immediate pleasures for the
sake of immediate pains that lead to greater pleasures (NE III.9, 1117a35-1117b1). For this
reason, habituation is necessary to train children to reflexively be pleased and pained in virtuous
ways. I will go on to show that shame is the necessary tool for habituation of children. Thumetic
desires are slightly more rational than appetetive. Thumetic desires do not require reason, but
they cause us to aim for what is noble and just because we seek the noble and just so that we
may be honored (Burnyeat 79). Being honored is very pleasurable for the young (Rhetoric II.12,
1389a2-13-14). Shame can help a child use thumos to over-ride their appetetive desires.

	
  

26	
  

CHAPTER THREE: HABIT AND EDUCATION
Every action is brought about by one of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit,
reasoning, anger, or appetite (Rhetoric I.10, 1369a5-7). Chance involves fortunate circumstances,
mere luck. Nature implies the state that is easiest for a person to be in. Compulsion is an urge to
do something. Habit will be discussed at length in the following chapter, and to summarize
briefly, it is a repetitive customary action or impulse. Reasoning is the ability to logically think
about the consequences of actions and parse through which course of action is best. Anger is
rather self-explanatory, and can prevent us from acting virtuously. Appetite, is the pull from our
physical desires for nourishment, hydration, sex, and intoxicants. The youth are especially likely
to be influenced by anger and appetite, for without reason, they do not have a fully developed
faculty for choosing action, or understanding that actions are in line with the good.
The crux of my thesis involves explaining how children become good without rationality,
for rationality is what allows one to realize the good, and act on it accordingly. The short answer
is, children do not have rationality, but they can become habituated to do certain actions. In fact,
habituation and pleasure-seeking are the driving force of all action as children, Aristotle would
argue.
The good is what each person desires, regardless of whether or not they are aware of that
fact. The good is therefore what the wise person would determine to be good through past
experience and ability to reason. For, reason allows the person to predict the various
consequences of any given action, and wisdom allows them to remember what actions lead to
specific consequences. What the wise person aims at, therefore, is a fairly accurate indication of
what Aristotle takes to be the good.
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However, the appetite, as we have discussed oftentimes distracts us from acting well,
especially in the young and immature, or if we have never challenged ourselves, or been forced
to act contrarily to our appetites.
Aristotle states that while we all aim toward the good, we merely aim at the appearance
of the good. The sort of person that we are will warp our sense of the good. Each person, having
their own disposition, will seek out what appears good to them given their own experiences with
the “good,” which also constitute the pivotal experiences that have made them what they are.
Most of us are naturally inclined to think that we act well, but we believe that, no matter our
intelligence or true level of virtue, our dispositions are correct, or at least on the right track, and
we will rationalize. What we do that we believe is good, is oftentimes inseparable from the
actions that we do. To clarify, we act in ways that we believe to be good, and are convinced they
are good because we may not be aware of another way.
Each person aims at “what appears to us good, we are not in control of the appearance,
but rather the sort of person each of us is, whatever that may be, determines how the end, too,
appears to him” (NE III.5, 1114a30-1114b1). Even if someone acts badly, they will still have
acted in a way that appeared to them good because they are ignorant as to why their action was
bad, and how it was not truly aiming toward the good. They mistake the appearance of the good
for the good because they know no better (NE III.5, 1114b1-1114b5). Though we all strive for
the good, it may be hard to grasp, for some firmly believe that the good is something that it is
not.
By nature, different things appeal differently to different individuals. Each person has
their own interests and tendencies that are a product of their upbringing and external influences.
This develops because we learn over time, knowingly or not, that certain things provide
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pleasures and others pains. We decide which we prefer, and organically come to prefer certain
things, see certain things as good or beneficial, and other things as bad or unfavorable. Ones
preferences are woven into a framework of each person’s conception of the good, accurate or not
(NE II.9, 1109b2-5). Furthermore, we are always more drawn towards pleasures than anything
else, “which is why we are more easily drawn in the direction of self-indulgence than of
orderliness” (NE II.8, 1109a15-16):
Aristotle provides a simple explanation of how we come to have preferences here:
All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to
habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational craving is a craving for good,
i.e. a wish—nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational
craving is two fold, viz. anger and appetite.” (Rhetoric I.10, 1369a1-4)
In other words, we are drawn to things by rationality or irrationality. If we are drawn to things
irrationally, then we are drawn to things because our appetites, our bodily hunger for food,
alcohol, other stimulation, are moving us in that direction. Therefore, since children do not have
rationality, they must be drawn to the good through other means, namely, what Aristotle calls
habituation. Virtue of character rather than virtue of intellect is what is developed through
habituation (NE II.1, 1103a16-18):
The virtues develop in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but because we
are naturally able to receive them and are brought to completion by means of
habituation. (NE II.1, 1103a24-27)
Habituation cannot change our nature. In the same way that a stone cannot be trained to
move upwards, and a fire cannot be trained to be cold, our nature cannot be changed (NE II.1,
1103a19-22). Nor can we become virtue by nature, without habituation (NE II.1, 1103a19-22).
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Habituation can only shift the way we act in a way that is not how we would naturally act, but
not against the laws of our own nature. For a human cannot do something that is not possible for
a human, though they can come to be a sort of human that most are not.
Through habituation, the forming of habits, we are bound to become one sort of person
rather than another; a person with a set of tendencies and skills not possessed by other persons.
Aristotle states that “we are ourselves responsible for having become the sort of person… for it is
the sort of activity we display in each kind of thing that gives us the corresponding character”
(NE III.5, 1114a5-8). People become a certain sort of person by doing things that that sort of
person does. We voluntary choose to act or not to act and therefore, the virtuousness or
viciousness of our character depends on us, for we can only be of a character that gives us
pleasure (NE III.5, 1114b19-22; NE III.5, 1113b14-15; NE I.8, 1099a5-16). One cannot be just if
one does not enjoy just action (NE I.8, 1099a17-26). Therefore, we cannot be of a certain
disposition if we do not enjoy that disposition or doing the corollary actions.
While at first, an action may be forced, the next several times will become easier, for it is
more familiar. Then, once one has done more of this type of action, that becomes habit, which is
the next most pleasurable thing to those that are pleasurable by nature (EE VI.10, 1152a29-34;
EE VI.5, 1148b17-18; EE II.7, 1223a33-36).
Habit is a substitute for what comes naturally, for after performing an action over and
over again, that action is what one becomes inclined to do, and it feels natural to do it (NE
VII.10, 1152a29-34):
Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that
they must have been intended, and that they prove the good qualities of the man
who did them. (Rhetoric I.9, 1367b25-27)
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The sum of one’s recent actions come to be the shape of one’s character. In short, you are what
you do routinely. When one repeatedly performs good actions, one becomes good. A person
becomes a builder by building, and a person becomes just through doing just things (NE II.1,
1103a33-1103b1).
In the chapter on virtue, I spoke about the difficulty of reaching it. One may only become
excellent through habituation. Aristotle speaks about aiming towards the goal of virtue as
shooting for a target. The target is flawless virtue, and the closer one gets, the more excellent one
becomes. If one deviates from virtue by way of an overactive temper, a streak of nastiness, a
tendency to be a coward, etc., this will deviate oneself from the center of the target. However,
slowly, one can train oneself through reason to see which actions would be more or less virtuous,
and take the path of greater virtue rather than lesser. In Aristotle’s own words, “since it is hard
to hit upon the intermediate with extreme accuracy, one should take to the oars and sail that
way…grasping what is least bad of what is available” (NE II.9, 1109a35-1109b2). When we
choose the least bad course of action from the options we are aware of, we remove ourselves
from what we understand to be vicious (as in the opposite of virtuous), and this drags us closer to
the center (NE II.9, 1109b5-7).
By choosing more virtuous action over lesser, one can gradually shift closer and closer to
the target, the aim of virtue. Though Aristotle would argue that the aim is perfect virtue, and
cannot be obtained by any person, it is an ideal that we may strive for, and benefit in aiming
toward the ideal. Despite how talented one might be at self-control, there is a powerful force
resisting against reason and self-control:
Take those with and without self-control: we praise their reason, and the aspect of
their soul that possesses reason; it gives the right encouragement, in the direction

	
  

31	
  

of what is best, but there appears to be something else besides reason that is
naturally in them, which fights against reason and resists it. (NE I.13, 1102b1419)
However, the natural human drive towards pleasure and away from pain makes this seemingly
simple path to virtue quite difficult. Aristotle cautions, “in everything we must guard most
against the pleasant, and pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges in its case.” (NE
II.9, 1109b7-9). As discussed in the chapter on pleasure and pain, it is always easier for us to
give in to pleasures than to withstand the pain and discomfort of denying oneself that pleasure.
This remains true even if one knows that over time, the pleasure will be greater over time by
refusing to take part in an immediate pleasure.
There is a problem. Habituation depends on us and is voluntary, but also involves a great
deal of reason. In order to become virtuous, we must use reason to logically determine which
courses of action are the most reasonable. Without reason, one would not have any faculty to
combat the drives toward pleasure and away from pain. The young, Aristotle believes, do not
have the ability to reason. Instead, they are guided by their emotions, especially anger and fear
(NE I.3, 1095a4-5; Rhetoric II.2, 1379a2-13).
How is one to become virtuous when they do not possess reason? As Aristotle points out,
it is impossible to persuade a child not to follow their emotions, like hunger, anger, excitement,
frustration, etc. (NE III.5, 1113b29-31). The young have not had enough life experience yet to
develop reason, or understand that their emotions and appetitive desires can be stifled for the
sake of future good, despite the immediate pains it may cause them (NE I.3, 1095a1-3). As
lawmakers shape the actions of their citizens through forcible correction, so too must children’s
actions be forcibly corrected through habituation (NE II.1, 1103b1-6; NE II.3, 1104b10-18).
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In order to ensure that a child can be properly habituated, their habits must be shaped and
set from an early age. This is of the utmost importance if they are to truly be habituated and
enjoy good actions as they would natural pleasures. I will remind the reader that virtuous
character must be accompanied by enjoyment for virtuous action. Therefore, if the process of
habituation begins too late, then one’s earlier habits and natural inclinations will be remembered
more as a source of pleasure than the current actions. For example, if a child has eaten candy for
breakfast over a period of years, it will feel natural for that child to enjoy candy for breakfast. If
one attempts to wean them off of this bad habit through habituation, it will be quite difficult, for
they have already come to know their past behavior as very pleasurable and it will be painful for
them to deny themselves of what already feels natural. Aristotle writes, “it does not make a small
difference whether people are habituated to behave in one way or another way from childhood
on, but a very great one; or rather, it makes all the difference in the world” (NE II.1 1103b2226):
[F]or no more will the sick person be healthy merely for wishing; and it may be
that he is ill voluntarily, by living a life in weak-willed disobedience to his
doctors. Previously, then, he had the option not to be ill, but once he let himself
go, he no longer has it, any more than it is possible for him to retrieve a stone
after it has left his hand; but all the same, it depended on him that it was thrown,
for the origin was him. (NE III.5, 1114a15-19)
Simply, once we have become habituated to be a certain sort of person, it becomes extremely
difficult to remedy that if we were habituated poorly. Moreover, we are the ones who make
ourselves virtuous or vicious based on our actions, regardless of whether we are a certain way
through rational thought or habituation.
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Additionally, we are not in control of our actions and character in the same way; “for we
are in control of our actions from beginning to end, because we know the particulars involved,
whereas we only control the beginning of our dispositions, and process of incrementation is not
something we are aware of in its particulars, any more than we are when are becoming ill” (NE
III.5, 1114b30-1115a2). In other words, it is far easier to be aware of our actions than our
dispositions, for the nature of an action is something that is easily observable, while the gradual
change of one’s character is not, because it is not immediate.
We have discussed already that our character is the sum of repeated similar actions, but
those actions must be “of a certain quality” (NE II.1, 1103b22-26). If one habitually plays guitar
poorly, one will become a poor guitar player (NE II.1, 1103b10-11). Conversely, if one is
habituated to perform actions well, then one will become a person who performs actions well
rather than badly.
Habits are formed through our own repetitive actions, and our decisions not to act also:
For when acting depends on us, not acting does so too and when saying no does
so, saying yes does too; so that if acting, when it is a fine thing to act, depends on
us, not acting also depends on us when it is shameful not to act, and if not acting,
when it is a fine thing not to act, depends on us, acting when it is a shameful thing
to act also depends on us. (NE III.5, 1113b7-13)
The onus is on us to act in the way that we wish our disposition to be. So, if we wish to be just or
moderate, we must act justly or moderately (NE II.4, 1105b9-10). Yet, this is difficult, and
people are discouraged by the prospect and initial discomfort of forgoing what is already natural
to them, or habit, for this is painful. Even if one wishes to be virtuous, and knows what the
virtuous person does, if they fail to do this, they will not become virtuous. Aristotle makes the
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comparison from this scenario to one in which sick people are told by doctors to do something,
and they fail to do what is prescribed for them to regain health (NE II.4, 1105b11-1105b18).
Since our actions determine our disposition, someone who fails to do what is virtuous in
favor of what comes easily or requires the least effort will become this sort of person to rely on
what is simple on their part too (NE II.2, 1103b30-31; NE II.2, 1104a21-23). By nature, we are
inclined to perform certain actions above others because they provide more pleasure than pain.
With reason, it is possible to come to the conclusion that by withstanding some immediate pain,
one will reap greater pleasures later. However, without reason, habituation only can cause
someone to choose what is naturally more painful over what is naturally more pleasurable.
Pleasures and pains make us who we are, for we act on them appropriately or not and this shapes
our character over time (NE II.2, 1104b20-24).
Aristotle holds that the virtuous person will be able to ascertain, “like a carpenters rule”
in any given circumstance what the virtuous action would be (NE III.4, 1113a33). However, it is
challenging to discover the virtuous action, for we are automatically drawn towards what would
be most pleasurable to us, which can keep us from action that is initially difficult or strenuous,
but more pleasurable overall; “Most people are deceived in the deception seems to come about
because a pleasure; for it appears a good thing when it’s not. So they choose what it’s pleasant
something good, and they avoid pain is something bad” (NE III.4, 1113a33-1113b2).
Now habituation is useful in that, if done properly, it can assist one in developing a
character which tends to resist immediate pleasures when the immediate pains felt are
overshadowed by greater pleasure later (NE III.12, 1119a25-28). “The pleasure or pain that
supervenes on what people do should be treated as a sign of their dispositions; for someone who
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holds back from bodily pleasure and does so cheerfully is a moderate person, while someone
who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent” (NE II.3, 1104b4-7)
Again, to many, the virtuous actions will not be clear, and they will be misled. However,
if one strives toward virtue, they will at least be better off than having not tried at all; “It is not
the function of medicine simple to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on
the road to health: it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy
sound health” (Rhetoric I.1, 1355b12-14). The many who will never become sufficiently
virtuous can at least, through habituation, reach a level of virtue above that which could be
reached without effort.
If one is not properly habituated through repeating the actions of the virtuous person, then
one will not become virtuous. Habituation can go awry when one’s external resources, including
education, family income, social status, birth, etc., are not sufficient. When one worries about
obtaining these resources, it is much less likely that one’s parents and mentors will have a clear
view of the good, and you yourself will have difficulty focusing on being virtuous when
worrying about obtaining the resources just mentioned. If life turns out not to be fortunate, “they
crush and maim one’s blessedness; for they bring on pains, and obstruct many sorts of activities”
(NE I.10, 1100b28-30).
Now, we have discussed why habituation is essential in shaping one’s character. Our
repeated actions of a similar sort will become like second nature to us, and we will enjoy those
actions that feel as though they come naturally to us. Therefore, we can come to act in ways that
are not natural, but truly spear natural to us in that they are the actions that we have come to
know to do in a given circumstance. However, the most important detail is that we take pleasure
in these habituated actions, and the corresponding disposition will be pleasing to us as well. And
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as Aristotle clearly argues, we cannot be just if we do not enjoy just action; in fact, we cannot be
any disposition if we do not take pleasure in the actions associated with that disposition (NE I.7,
1097a31-1097b5; NE I.9, 1099a17-22). Therefore, it is impossible to be virtuous if one does not
take pleasure in performing virtuous action. So, one must be habituated in a manner that
gradually causes one to enjoy virtuous action as those actions begin to feel more natural rather
than forced and uncomfortable. In the following chapter, I will discuss why a child cannot be
habituated properly to take pleasure in virtuous action without shame.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ON SHAME
“Something I fain would say to thee,
Only shame restraineth me.” (58) – Alcaues
One difficulty in describing shame is explaining exactly what Aristotle believes it to be.
Yet it is important to understand what precisely Aristotle classifies as, for then we can
understand it as another of the category of things that Aristotle thinks it is. Aristotle makes clear
that shame is not an virtue. Some of the qualities that qualify as shameful include cowardice,
injustice, greed, meanness, having a disposition of a flatter, low tolerance for things, and
boastfulness (Rhetoric II.6, 1383b21-1384a7).
Shame is not included anywhere in his list of virtues in either the Nichomachean Ethics
for the rhetoric. In fact, Aristotle says explicitly that “shame should not be described as an
virtue” because it is more like an affection than a disposition (NE IV.9, 1128b10-11). Shame
then, is not a virtue, because it should not be a permanent characteristic, but it serves as an
emotion that guides us. Shame is only for the young, after all, because the virtuous person will
not do shameful things (NE IV.9, 1128b17-20). At first this is puzzling. Aristotle clearly thinks
that shame is a necessary and oftentimes, an undeniably good thing.
What makes team of passion rather than a virtue for Aristotle is that shame causes a
predictable physiological reaction in the body, namely that people who are ashamed will blush
(NE IV.9, 1128b13-15). Something that brings about the change in bodily condition for Aristotle
seems to be a passion rather than a state for it overcomes the person suddenly and physically (NE
IV.9, 1128b13-15). Aristotle also claims that shame’ is a “kind of fear of disrepute” and it is akin
to the fear of danger (NE IV.9, 1128b11-13). Aristotle clarifies, “people are praised for having a
sense of shame too,” though there can be excess and deficient levels of shame and a person also
(NE II.8, 1108a32-36).
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The individual who is excessive in shame Aristotle claims, becomes anxious about
everything is well because she makes them wary about acting on anything (NE II.8, 1108a3237). Meanwhile the person who is deficient and shame is shameless which Aristotle says that
“shame may be defined as a pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or
future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit and shamelessness as contempt or
indifference in regard to these same bad things” (Rhetoric II.6, 1383b15-17). So, shame is a fear
of acting in a way that dishonors oneself, and we fear this very dishonor. A child’s reputation is
important, for they wish to be loved and honored, as was explained in Chapter Two.
Aristotle argues that shame as not an virtue because, while it is a good thing to feel shame
if one does something wrong, the virtuous person does not willingly act wrongly (NE IV.9,
1128b27-33). Therefore shame as not a feature of the virtuous person, nor is it an virtue. In the
same way that “health is the end of medicine, a ship of ship building, victory of generalship, and
wealth of household management,” so too is virtue and rationality a sort of end to shameful
feeling (NE I.1, 1094a7-8).
We also “feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to
those we care for” (Rhetoric II.6, 1383b17-19). Aristotle is quick to note that we feel shame in
front of those that we consider are equals or better. We wish to take part in the honorable
reputation of those individuals of our own ethnicity, nationality, age, family, level of education
etc. (Rhetoric II.6, 1384a9-16). It is also rather shameful to not live up to the standards of one’s
own community, because we are, in a sense, constantly competing for honor and a good
reputation within our own communities (Rhetoric II.6, 1384b27-30, Rhetoric II.6, 1384a9-13). If
those like yourself all advance on to get their doctorate, you will likely feel somewhat ashamed
at having stopped at a Bachelors or Masters degree.
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Along those same lines, we feel shame to a greater extent when we do something
shameful in front of those that we spend a lot of time with, those that we know will remember
our shameful actions (Rhetoric II.6, 1384a35-1384b1).
Aristotle sees something important—that we are only afraid of the disgrace following
shameful actions rather than the consequences of the actions:
Now since shame is the imagination of disgrace, in which we
shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and
we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who
form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel
shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us. (Rhetoric II.6,
1384a24-27)
Shame is unpleasant because it involves the fear of being discredited by one’s peers, whom one
would rather be held in high esteem. However, we don’t feel shame in front of children or
animals, because they are, in a sense, below us, and their opinions are not as important to us, nor
can it tarnish our reputations if they happen to dislike something we do (Rhetoric II.6, 1384b2326).
Rather, the only people we can feel shame in front of are “those who admire us, those
whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing,
and those whose opinion of us we respect,” as well as those “who possess any good thing that is
highly esteemed; or from whom we are very anxious to get something that they are able to give
us…[w]e compete with our equals” (Rhetoric II.6, 1384a27-32).
So, we feel shame in front of the people who’s opinions we value, or whose opinions will
color the opinions of others we do care about (Rhetoric II.6, 1384a24-27). Moreover, we will
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feel even more ashamed if we know an action will cause someone we care for to be associated
with our shame as well (NE V.8, 1135b16-25, NE I.5, 1095b21-27; NE IX.2, 1165b13-17)
Feelings of shame are strengthened in front of those who are more apt to judge harshly:
We also feel it before those not open to the same imputation as
ourselves; for it is plain that their opinions about it are the opposite
of ours. Also before those who are hard on anyone whose conduct
they think wrong; for what a man does himself, he is said not to
resent when his neighbours do it: so that of course he does resent
their doing what he does not do himself. (Rhetoric II.6, 1384a351384b5)
Throughout his works, Aristotle seems to suggest that shame is effective only because we
measure our own value by the value that others ascribe to us. By acting in a manner distasteful to
those whose opinions we care about, we sense that distaste, and understand that our actions have
lowered our standing in the eyes of others. Then, we feel some loathing for our judgment in
acting as we did and making ourselves appear inferior to the way we picture ourselves to be.
Aristotle believed that the youth were the only ones who should feel shame. He holds that
“the passion [i.e. shame] is not becoming to every age, but only to youth” (NE IV.9, 1128b16).
The thinking is that the young do not have the ability to reason yet and are instead driven by
passions. Therefore they make a great deal of mistakes, which often lead to feelings of shame in
some degree or another. So, shame is something reserved for the young because mature adults
are expected to control their action through reasoning rather than through their passions (NE
IV.9, 1128b16-22).
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Thus far, we have established that shame is a passion rather than an virtue, that virtuous
people do not experience shame (and if so, rarely), that shame is more acute when one’s bad
actions are exposed to people that one knows or cares for, that shame is reserved for the youth,
and that rationality and virtue put an end to shame. Let us now explore the mechanics of shame,
and how it works to create a sense of morality in children.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ON THE ROLE OF SHAME IN DEVELOPING VIRTUE
“Every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. It
those not due to himself, some are due to chance, the others to necessity; of these
latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature.” (Rhetoric I.10,
1368b33-36)
Any action that has an origin, and that origin may be ourselves, or something else. Since we are
concerned with action that are due to ourselves, we will discuss this rather than chance,
compulsion, or the like.
All actions that are due to a man himself are due either to habit or to rational
good, i.e. a wish—nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational
craving is two fold, viz. anger and appetite. (Rhetoric I.10, 1369a1-4)
We do not act in ways that we think bad. No matter what action we take, we take it because it
appears good to us, because we know it will bring us pleasure, or because while the action is not
ideal, it is done for the greater good or pleasure over time. Rational craving is one way that
adults can decide to act.
Children do not yet have the capacity for reason. For children, their action is due to a
combination of habit, anger, and appetite. Actions of a similar sort over time become habit. The
collection of one’s habits form one’s disposition. One’s disposition also affects the sort of
actions that a child will naturally be inclined to do. However, our dispositions contain bad
qualities which lead to us acting wrongly.
We do wrong, regardless of age or maturity, because of the bad qualities we have within
ourselves; “For the wrongs a man does to others will correspond to the bad quality or qualities
that he himself possesses” (Rhetoric I.10, 1368b14-15). An angry person will act with a greater
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propensity for anger than a person who is not angry, but calm. The temperate person meanwhile,
will not allow their appetites to control them and drive them to satisfy their appetitive desires.
There are actions we do for the sake of the good, but appetite causes us to act for the sake
of immediate pleasures (NE III.1, 1118b9-23; EE II.7, 1223a33-36) Aristotle claims that appetite
is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant (Rhetoric I.10, 1369b15-16). But, it is almost more
pleasurable to give in to appetite than habit, because habit is more natural, and perhaps less
conflicting:
Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of
pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men
perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all
actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant. (Rhetoric
I.10, 1369b17-20)
If all actions appear to be good or pleasant, then how is a child expected to change their
behavior without reason to let them deliberate what is truly good and pleasant? As soon as we
become habituated to do something, it becomes natural, unforced, and therefore, pleasurable;
“Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural”
(Rhetoric I.11, 1370a5-6). They must be habituated through shame then so that the corrected
actions become natural and pleasurable. Over time, these new actions will inform upon the
child’s disposition as well.
We are always looking to impress others, and improve who we are in the way we see is
improvement. We always have a dispositional goal that we aspire to by adjusting our behavior,
or hoping to maintain by acting in a similar way to the past. “Honour is the token of a man’s
being famous for doing good” and therefore, what one does virtuously, as the good person would
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do, is honorable, and worthy of praise (Rhetoric I.5, 1361a26-29). For Aristotle, actions are
typically neutral, praiseworthy, or blameworthy. The more praiseworthy action one performs, the
more honorable one generally becomes in a community which does in fact value virtue. In order
to become virtuous, we must live in a virtuous community.
“Honour and credit bestowed by those whom you think much inferior to yourself—
e.g., children or animals—you do not value” (Rhetoric I.11, 1371a14-16). Therefore, a child
would not be honored by younger children or children that they feel are inferior to them, but only
children that they saw as superior to them, adults, parents, teachers, and other mentors.
Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things of all; they make a
man see himself in the character of a fine fellow, especially when he is credited
with it by people whom he thinks good judges. His neighbors are better judges
than people at a distance; his associates and fellow-countrymen better than
strangers; his contemporaries better than posterity, sensible persons better than
foolish ones, a large number of people better than a small number. (Rhetoric I.11,
1371a8-18)
In other words, honor and repute, hand-in-hand with praise, is extremely pleasant, and children
do not need reason to feel the pleasure of these things.
While children do not yet have the capacity of reason, they are not limited to
motivation of the appetitive pleasures. Children possess the capacity for thumetic pleasure also.
Thumos, epithumia, previsouly established habits, and a desire to avoid pain are the only means
available to a child to lead them to action. We have already described why one avoids pain, is
drawn to appetitive pleasures in the absence of reason, and succumbs to the near-natural
pleasures of habit. However, we must now discuss how children are affected by thumos.
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Children do not have the capacity for reason, and act impulsively with their appetitive
passions and habits as a guide to their activity. The question is, how are we to forcibly correct the
behavior of a child when they do not have the capacity to reason or simply will away their
appetitive desires?
The answer is shame. Children can be molded with shame in a way that can allow them
to alter their behavior without reason, and habituate them to act virtuously, thus setting them up
to be virtuous when virtuous action becomes habitual and pleasurable.
People still act wrongly. Aristotle explains that wrongdoing is “injury voluntarily
inflicted contrary to law…by general law, [I mean] all those unwritten principles which are
supposed to be acknowledged everywhere” (Rhetoric I.10, 1368b7-9). Children, cannot injure
voluntarily, if they have no reason to know what they are doing. But can, in a way choose one
thing over another based on their appetitive desires and established habits.
Aristotle writes that “we deliberately do bad things out of either vice[, a lack of virtue,] or
a lack of self-control” (Rhetoric I.10, 1368b13-14). Children may or may not have virtuous
qualities and habits, depending on their habituation. However, in a void, they could not control
their appetitive desires. They must build habits to forgo appetitive pleasures and impulses. To do
this takes work, effort, and forcible correction.
Aristotle compares the process of habituation to the process that lawmakers go through in
shaping the actions of their citizens. Lawmakers must forcibly correct wrongdoers who may have
done something out of natural inclinations or because they were ignorant of the law or the good
through fines or the like. They reward those who perform good and admirable actions through
praise or by some other means to encourage citizens to perform good actions and abstain from
wrong or base actions (NE III.5, 1113b23-27; NE III.5, 1113b37-1114a1).
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When we take pleasure in a given activity, it is very difficult to end the pleasurable
activity. Perhaps the activity is formed out of habit, or perhaps it has not become habitual yet, but
still, there is such pleasure in it that it is difficult or nearly impossible to stop on one’s own
without an external force, especially for a child. A child does not possess reason that a more
mature adult could use to convince him or herself that forgoing the pleasure is for the best.
Aristotle uses the example of a law-making politician to illustrate the use forcible
correction:
[T]estimony to this effect seems to be provided by the practice both of different
sorts of private groups and lawgiver’s themselves; for they forcibly correct and
impose penalties on wrongdoers, provided they did not act under force, or because
of ignorance for which they’re not themselves responsible, while they honour
those who perform fine actions, in order to encourage the latter and put a stop to
the former. (NE III.5, 1113b23-27)
In this manner, when a child acts wrongly, determined by their guardians, mentors, or peers, they
may have been in ignorance as to why their action was blameworthy and wrong. However, they
can still be shown that their actions were not acceptable, thereby placing a stain of blame and
dishonor on the wrong action. This takes away some of the pleasure from the action, and
anticipation of the action itself.
When we are aware that discomfort or blame will follow an action, we are less likely to
enjoy the anticipation of the action since anticipating the pleasure of the act would also
necessitate anticipating the pain of being chastised and dishonored.
Aristotle writes, “that is pleasant which is not forced on is; for force is unnatural, and that
is why what is compulsory is painful” (Rhetoric I.11, 1370a8-10). Therefore, whenever a child is
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shown that an action they find is pleasant is blameworthy and intolerable, they will be compelled
to act differently, in a way that does not cause blame to overshadow their actions and bring about
the disapproval of those they share relationships with. I will explore this now.
To reiterate, shame is a fear of disrepute. Shame works because it causes one pain that
becomes greater than the pain of acting in the way one’s appetites and habit lead us to act.
Aristotle states that “I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things
and the change of a greater pain for a less” (Rhetoric I.10, 1369b26-27). When someone causes
us to realize that an action of ours was shameful, we see ourselves the way another does. Our
action has caused someone else to see us as inferior to how we previously stood in their view.
Again, we can only feel shame in front of those we admire, respect, and feel some kinship to.
Children do not have reason. They do use thumetic and appetitive drives to act. We
have not yet discussed thumetic desire and capacity. Essentially, thumos is the will to be honored
by those whose opinions matter to us. We mimic those who we want to be like. By imitating a
person who has a healthy stride, it appears that we ourselves have a healthy stride, and then we
become healthy striders. This is because we mimic the people that we hold in high esteem. We
want to be around those we respect, admire, or see as having some degree of virtue within them.
This could be because we admire others based on what our conception of value in another
person. Whether or not our conception is correct, it informs the values that we ourselves possess,
and we then admire those who have more of those qualities which we strive for ourselves.
Aristotle states; “The features typical of friendship for others…seem to derive from a
relationship towards ourselves” (NE IX.4, 1166a1-3). Our relationship with ourselves seems to
inform how we see others. What we wish to become is the sort of person that we admire and try
to have a relationship with:
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For this sort makes the same judgments as himself, and desires the same things in
respect of his whole soul; and he certainly wishes for that is good for itself, and
what appears food, and he does it (for it is a mark of a good person to work hard
at what is good), and for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the thinking
element of himself, which is what each of us is thought to be). (NE IX.4,
1166a14-17)
We have a deep desire to share the company of others who we see as similar to ourselves, those
who have similar values as ourselves, and those who have realized the goals that we set for our
character and life accomplishments.
The friend, the mentor, the role model, is nothing more than a version of ourselves. And
we act towards our friends as we would ourselves, and hope that our friends will act in ways we
admire or would approve of ourselves, for “[one’s] friend is another self” (NE IX.4, 1166a3132).
We also tend to think well of ourselves; “[S]ince everything like and akin to oneself is
pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else, it
follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves” (Rhetoric I.11, 1371b18-20). And
“what is our own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words” (Rhetoric
I.11, 1371b23-24). Since we tend to seek out friendship in those whose deeds and words are like
what we imagine to be good, we seek the friendship or other relationships with those we find
similar to ourselves, or what we wish we could be.
And since we tend to love and think fondly of ourselves, and our relationship with our
friends is parallel to one with ourselves, “[f]riends belong to the category of pleasant things, it is
pleasant to love—if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful” (Rhetoric I.11, 1371a16-17).
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Yet, in the same way that we may lose interest in a friend who diverges from acting in a
way that we can relate to as “good,” we must ourselves remain somewhat a certain way at the
risk of losing our friends and other relations:
[F]or example with children’s friendships: if one side continued to think as a child
while the other became a man of the most powerful sort, how could they be
friends, when they are not satisfied by the same things, and when they don’t share
pleasures and pains? (NE IX.3, 1165b26-30)
Therefore, if we ourselves begin acting repetitively in a way that repulses, displeases, or
confuses our friends and relations, then those communal bonds we have will be strained and may
break apart. Since it is not pleasant to lose the love and respect of those we admire, and enjoy the
company of, we do not purposely displease our friends and relations, for we do not want to
destroy those relationships we value.
Perhaps the greatest reason why we do not do this is that it is pleasurable to be loved,
admired, cared for by another; “It is pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as
the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess: to
be loved means to be valued for one’s own personal qualities. To be admired is also pleasant,
simple because of the honour implies” (Rhetoric I.11, 1371a18-22).
Honor is inextricably tied to friendship. Friendship is a relationship based on one’s honor
and another’s. Depending on how we feel about ourselves and our own repute, we will become
friends with people of greater or lesser virtue, or what we think to be honorable qualities. We
will not accept friendship from anyone; “As for honour from just anyone, and given for things,
he will whole despise it, because that is not that he is worthy of—and he will reject dishonours in
the same way, for it will not justly attach to him” (NE IV.3, 1124a10-12). It becomes
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dishonorable to stoop in one’s friendships or have someone far inferior to yourself (that clearly
does not have the potential to be as virtuous as you) bidding for your friendship seriously.
Since “it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great,” and “any
superiority is held to reveal virtue,” it is the most honorable thing to surpass individuals who are
more virtuous than ourselves (Rhetoric I.9, 1368a23; Rhetoric I.9, 1368a26). By surpassing
individuals more virtuous than ourselves, we find pleasure in knowing that we can use our
progress to forge relationships with people with even greater stature. The thumetic pleasure of
being a recipient of an honorable person’s friendship, admiration, and respect is great, and we
will continue seeking such pleasures. Thumetic pleasure is a quasi-rational pleasure to do with
honor. Since friendship is a relationship with another person who reflects our own values and
sense of honor, it is also a thumetic pleasure.
It becomes pleasant to imitate a person that is admired and honorable. The honor that that
person is the recipient of is due to their honorable qualities. Children quickly find that imitation
is pleasant because it brings the admiration of their betters. Furthermore, “since learning and
wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant”
(Rhetoric I.11, 1371b4-5). Imitation is enjoyable when it allows a child to learn to act in ways
that bring the praise of those whose opinions they care about.
Just imagine, if a child’s behavior is erratic, spoiled, or quick to anger, how would one go
about correcting the child’s behavior and initiate the shame process? First, you would begin also
by praising what the child does virtuously and say why that is admirable:
Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge
people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you
would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an
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action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite
forms of expression accordingly. (Rhetoric I.9, 1368a8-10)
It is absolutely necessary to praise a child for good behavior and positive actions. When they
know what brings their role models a sense of pride in them, they will continue to perform these
actions because it is pleasurable for them to please those they consider to be their superiors. The
child’s sense of self will be elevated because of this praise in a way that makes them want to live
up to the higher expectations and prove their worthiness.
Now, when they act negatively, attaching a connotation of blame and shame to actions
that are vicious or unwanted will have the opposite effect. Take someone the child cares about
and thinks of as a superior calls negative attention to the action performed by the child. The child
will now begin to feel ashamed that they have displeased someone whose opinions they care
about. When this occurs, the child feels as though their image has slipped. They have become
inferior, and must make this up to the person who expressed the displeasure so they can reestablish their status with them. Though reason has not developed in children, they are still have
access to appetite and spiritedness. The highest thumetic pleasure is having honor bestowed upon
us.
Once a child sees that their action has caused them to lose some favor from those they
admire and care for, they will know that they must fix their behavior and avoid what brings them
appetitive pleasure for the sake of the much more gratifying pleasure of honor from those we
admire and respect. Aristotle states that it is easier to forgo pleasure than to withstand pain.
Therefore, it will be easier for the child to forgo appetitive or habitual pleasures for the sake of
avoiding the pain of shame and feeling themselves unworthy of honor from their community (NE
III.12, 1119a25-28; NE III.4, 1113a33-1113b2).
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Further, shame causes a need to repair something defective in oneself. When we set out
to change ourselves for the better, we become pleased by this project because it is an effort of
ours that we know will have a pleasant and satisfying outcome for us. It is also pleasant to feel
that one has the power to improve when others struggle. Or know that one can improve oneself
and see the approval in others’ eyes (Rhetoric I.11, 1371b22-24).
Shame is critical for a child to develop morality and virtue, yet there are circumstances in
which it is done improperly, and does not work in the way I spoke of earlier. It is ineffective
when someone that the child does not respect the person attempting to invoke a feeling of shame.
It also does not work when the child becomes angry with the person invoking shame. This is
most likely to occur when the shame goes too far to humiliation and when the person shaming
the child uses physical force or fails to explain why the action is associated with those who are
inferior to what the child wishes to be.
Without shame, a child cannot become virtuous. Shame affiliates a once pleasant
action with thumetic pain that supersedes the pain of forgoing that pleasure. The influence of a
child’s mentors and guardians are great, so the child’s will to seek their approval will give them
cause to act in ways that please them. In this way, the child gradually begins to avoid actions
which previously were brought on by appetitive impulses for the sake of improving their
standing in the mind’s of those they care for. Each time a child acts in a way that their superiors
would deem virtuous, they will become more and more habituated to act as the virtuous person
acts. And so, once a child acts as the virtuous do out of habit, it becomes natural to them,
pleasant. In this way, a child becomes virtuous by way of shame and in the absence of reason.
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CLOSING
Aristotle details how reasoning, mature adults are able to habituate themselves. The adult
with reason simply thinks through what he thinks to be the best, most virtuous action, and does
that action. If an adult wishes to become healthier and more temperate, all he has to do is figure
out what are the healthiest sorts of habits and begin working to form those habits. At first, this
will not be easy, but over time, if he is diligent, he will desire the healthy foods and exercises he
has become habituated to enjoy. Children, however, do not have reason, and so they cannot
figure what is good. All they can aim at is the apparent good. Thus, Aristotle leaves us
wondering, how children become virtuous without reason to guide them? In the thesis I argue
that shame is the key emotion that allows children, with the help of a virtuous community, to
become habituated to act virtuously. This is one reason Aristotle claims that in order to be
virtuous one must belong to a virtuous community.
Children do not, according to Aristotle have reason, but their parents, older relatives,
teachers, and mentors do. When a child acts in a way they should not have, those who know this
and have a close relationship with the child can invoke a sense of shame in the child, thus
causing the child to feel he has been dishonorable and diminishing his sense of self-worth. More
importantly, it makes the child fear that future actions of a similar strand would risk losing the
love and respect of those they care about and look up to. This fear mixed with the sense that they
acted in a way that did not demonstrate a good and admirable character, causes them to alter their
future behavior. Gradually, the unwanted behaviors will be eradicated from a child’s repertoire
of habitual actions. Shame, and shame alone, is the one emotion that can invoke the drive in
children to correct their behavior in the absence of reason.
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